Lackey, Jennfer, and . Norms of Assertion

2007, Noûs 41 (4): 594–626.

Introduction: I shall argue that the Knowledge Norm of Assertion is false. In particular, I shall show that there are cases in which a speaker asserts that p in the absence of knowing that p without being subject to criticism in any relevant sense, thereby showing that knowledge cannot be what is required for proper asser- tion. I shall then develop and defend an alternative norm of assertion – what I shall call the Reasonable to Believe Norm of Assertion – that not only avoids the problems afflicting the Knowledge Norm of Assertion but also more fully and co- herently accommodates our general intuitions about both asserters and their assertions.

Comment: This is an important paper on the norm of assertion, in which Lackey criticises the knowledge norm and argues for a reasonable-to-believe norm. It is a must-have teaching material for upper level undergraduate courses on epistemology or philosophy of language, sessions on assertion or epistemic norms.

Lackey, Jennfer, and . Acting on Knowledge

2010, Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 361-382.

Summary: This paper argues that there are various kinds of cases in which a subject clearly knows that p, yet it is not epistemically appropriate for her to use the proposition that p in practical reasoning, to act as if p, or act on p. Knowledge is not, therefore, always sufficient for epistemically justifying practical rationality, unlike what says in the sufficiency condition of the knowledge norm of practical reasoning. In addition, it offers a diagnosis of what is salient in the above cases and suggests a broad feature that needs to be accounted for in any view of the norm governing practical rationality.

Comment: This is a nice paper arguing against the knowledge norm of practical reasoning, in particular the sufficiency condition. It is suitable for teaching on epistemic norms and pragmatic encroachement in a upper-level undergraduate course on epistemology.